Outsiders had little reason to notice when David Reber stepped down as Nvidia's chief security officer in August. He cited health reasons, disclosing in a LinkedIn post that he had been diagnosed with young-onset Parkinson's more than two years earlier. Two and a half months later, CEO Jensen Huang left the company over questions about his extramarital relationships, which began with an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore data center company that U.S. investigators suspect of funneling Nvidia chips to China.
Nothing public connects Reber's departure or his replacement's arrival to the Megaspeed matter. Saša Zdjelar, who previously worked at ExxonMobil, Salesforce and ReversingLabs, did not respond to questions about the transition or what the security team knew. Reber also did not respond, and Nvidia has not answered related questions. Those silences leave a basic question open: did anyone in security know about the government's scrutiny of Megaspeed, or about Huang's relationships, and did anyone raise concerns?
Relationships between a CEO and his staff usually belong to HR, legal and the board. Still, security specialists say any affair can give a foreign intelligence service leverage over an executive who wants it kept quiet. Nicholas Eftimiades, a retired senior intelligence officer who says he has trained more than 1,000 corporate security professionals, notes that intelligence services often gather information through everyday conversation rather than hacking, which makes risks hard to spot. He also points out that security teams are often underfunded, because they do not drive revenue. Many companies, specialists say, define security too narrowly and neglect insider threats and suspicious relationships.
Some people inside Nvidia clearly knew parts of the picture. The New York Times reported that the company's top lawyer engaged with the government's Megaspeed inquiry more than a year ago, and Nvidia has said it regularly contacts officials. Reports about Huang's relationships also suggest colleagues were aware, even if the conduct was not expressly forbidden by Nvidia's code of conduct. The open question is whether any of that reached the security team, and whether it could have acted on it.
Nvidia's security function should be held to a higher standard than most. Given the company's scale and its business partners, a broader remit would be expected, and the board's independent investigation should say plainly who knew what and when. Eftimiades' broader point also deserves attention: he says U.S. industry is largely unprepared for China's tactics and that current approaches are not working. Nvidia should be the case study that forces that reckoning, not another episode quietly closed.